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IS IDENTITY PER SE IRRELEVANT? A CONTRARIAN VIEW
OF SELF-VERIFICATION EFFECTS
Aiden P. Gregg
Self-verification theory (SVT) posits that people who hold negative self-views,
such as depressive patients, ironically strive to verify that these self-views are
correct, by actively seeking out critical feedback or interaction partners who
evaluate them unfavorably. Such verification strivings are allegedly directed
towards maximizing subjective perceptions of prediction and control. None-
theless, verification strivings are also alleged to stabilize maladaptive self-
perceptions, and thereby hindering therapeutic recovery. Despite the widespread
acceptance of SVT, I contend that the evidence for it is weak and circumstantial.
In particular, I contend that that most or all major findings cited in support of
SVTcan be more economically explained in terms of raison oblige theory (ROT).
ROT posits that people with negative self-views solicit critical feedback, not
because they want it, but because they their self-view inclines them regard it as
probative, a necessary condition for considering it worth obtaining. Relevant
findings are reviewed and reinterpreted with an emphasis on depression, and
some new empirical data reported. Depression and Anxiety 26:E49–E59, 2009.
r 2008 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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‘‘I dislike arguments of any kind. They are always
vulgar, and often convincing.’’
— Lady Brackwell, in Oscar Wilde’s The Importance
of Being Earnest
I would like to thank Professor Uhde for inviting me to
comment upon the recently published article by[1]
entitled Self-verification and depression in abused women.
Before the article’s publication, I had the privilege of
being asked to review it. In my review, I observed that the
research reported in the article, whatever its other merits
or demerits, relied upon a set of fundamental assump-
tions, namely, those underlying self-verification theory
(SVT).[2–4] In this article, I wish to challenge those
assumptions. This is an ambitious undertaking, given that
SVT currently enjoys the status of conventional wisdom
within the field social and personality psychology.
Moreover, most of what I say will amount to a conceptual
critique of existing research, although I shall present
some preliminary findings to bolster my case. In addition,
although I will review a range of findings, I shall focus on
depression, and will conclude by specifically addressing
the research reported by.[1]
THE ESSENCE OF SVT
SVT proposes that people habitually seek to confirm
their existing self-views. The alleged reason? A coherent
sense of oneself is vital for effective psychological and
interpersonal functioning.[2–5] In particular, without a
stable self-concept, people’s perceptions of their
capacity to predict and control their own lives, and their
interactions with others, would be fatally under-
mined.[6,7] As a result, people, needing to believe that
they are who they think they are, strive to verify that
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they are who they think they are.1 They do this
principally by embracing information consistent with
their existing self-views, and disdaining information
inconsistent with those self-views. Importantly, it
should not matter, for the purposes of safeguarding
psychic coherence, whether one’s self-views are positive
or negative, true or false: what should matter, rather, is
that they are consistently held. In other words, SVT
makes the bold claim that identity matters per se, above
and beyond the valence or accuracy of its content.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF SVT
Now, if SVT is true, then it has an unsettling
implication: people who hold negative self-views will at
some level want to believe that those negative self-views
are true. And, of course, wanting to believe that they
are true, they will be averse to disconfirming them.
Such aversion will then impede the success of any
therapeutic intervention aimed at banishing those
negative self-views. For example, chronic depression
would be hard to alleviate, not only because the
condition itself is functionally or biochemically stub-
born, but also because those who suffer from it, having
regarded themselves as depressed for so long, would
irrationally seek to keep seeing themselves as depressed, for
fear their long-standing identity might be undermined.
Accordingly, people with chronic depression would
solicit feedback that verifies rather than refutes their
negative self-view, thereby hindering their recovery.
Now, although this implication of SVT is unsettling,
it at least promises to shed light on the seemingly
irrational persistence of many negative self-views. For
example, people suffering from low self-esteem,
whether as a standalone condition or as a symptom of
depression, tend to regard themselves as worthless and
undeserving, even though their objective virtues and
achievements may strongly indicate otherwise.[8] Such
unwarranted self-negativity is prima facie puzzling.
However, SVT contends that people cling to their
unflattering images of self because those are the only
self-images they have, and without them they would be
lost. Simply put, people endure the frying pan of self-
reproach to escape the flames of self-uncertainty.
However, if SVT is false, then it would be positing an
illusory impediment to recovery from clinical condi-
tions that, like depression, entail a negative self-view.
Therapeutic applications based on SVT, or those
taking account of it, would therefore be misdirected,
conceivably to the detriment of their efficacy. More-
over, the message of SVT would be unduly pessimis-
tic—a hindrance to people whose capacity to hope is
already impaired, and whose positive expectations need
to be mobilized. Clearly, then, it matters a great deal
whether SVT is true or false. Consequently, its
theoretical and empirical bases merit scrutiny.
THE EVIDENCE FOR SVT
On the face of it, the evidence cited in favor SVT
looks robust, for four reasons. First, the evidence is
predominantly behavioral in nature. Rather than merely
consisting, say, of subjective reports about which type
of self-related feedback or interaction partners people
prefer, it also consists of their objective choices for one
type of self-related feedback or interaction partner over
another.[9–11] Second, the evidence is convergent. Find-
ings from a variety of domains—from patterns of
attention([12]: Study 1) to martial intimacy[13]—see-
mingly support SVT. Third, the evidence consists, not
only of predicted main effects, but also of predicted
moderator effects.[14] This means that any rival theory
has more explanatory work to do. Finally, the evidence
consists of several findings that reliably replicate[4,15]).
Hence, SVT does not merely capitalize upon statistical
flukes.
Space constraints preclude an exhaustive summary of
the evidence for SVT. Fortunately, some of the best
evidence derives from studies purporting to show that
depressed people strive to verify their self-views—the
claim of potentially greatest interest to readers of this
journal. Hence, these studies will be the focus of my
initial exposition and subsequent critique. The key
articles are.[16–18]
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF SELF-
VERIFICATION EFFECTS IN
DEPRESSED PEOPLE
Suppose people with a positive self-view (e.g., joyful,
optimistic, and self-accepting) were to characteristi-
cally solicit information consistent with their self-views
(i.e., flattering information). Would that suggest the
operation of a motive to verify their existing identity?
No. This reason is that such behavior would equally
suggest the operation of another well-known and
potent motive: to self-enhance.[19,20] However, if
people with a negative self-view (e.g., gloomy, pessi-
mistic, and self-critical) solicited information consis-
tent with their self-views, this would not be the case.
Rather, such a pattern of solicitation would imply that
the motive to self-enhance could even be subverted by a
more powerful motive.
So what does the relevant research show?
Indeed, unlike cheerful people, depressed people are
1SVT draws a distinction between epistemic self-verification (ESV),
which aims at preserving intrapsychic coherence, and pragmatic self-
verification (PSV), which aims at keeping social interactions running
smoothly. In this letter, I concern myself primarily with ESV. The
reason is that ESV, unlike PSV, is hypothesized to have the
reinforcement of identity as a direct goal. That is, although PSV
may, through the feedback it elicits, result in identity being
reinforced, its hypothesized direct goal is the fostering of inter-
personal harmony. In this regard, PSV seems like a subspecies of the
evolutionarily adaptive need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, [5]), and its
connection to identity may be accidental.
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more likely to opt to meet evaluators who rate
them unfavorably as opposed to favorably([16]: Experi-
ment 1). Furthermore, depressed people, when offered
the choice between reading a favorable or unfavorable
assessment of their personality, mainly opt for the
latter, whereas cheerful people in contrast, mainly opt
for the former.[18] Finally, depressed people are prone
to ask questions that typically yield more critical and
less flattering feedback, both from alleged observers
actual roommates and alleged observers[16]: Experi-
ments 3 and 4). In sum, depressed people reliably act in
ways that lead to them receiving information in
keeping with their negative self-views.
There are also indications that depressed people
actively solicit negative information. For example,
depressed people not only opt to interact with
evaluators who rate them unfavorably as opposed to
favorably, they also do so as an alternative to
participating in an unrelated experiment[17]: Experi-
ment 1). In addition, depressed people are more apt to
solicit information about specific weaknesses relative to
specific strengths after receiving generally flattering
feedback; in contrast, cheerful people are more apt to
solicit information about specific strengths relative to
specific weakness after receiving generally critical
feedback[17]: Experiment 2). In sum, depressed people
flee flattery and court criticism, even when they need
not do so.
Further grounds for postulating a motive to self-
verify are provided by self-reported ratings. For
example, depressed people, relative to cheerful people,
ideally like to viewed less positively (although never
actually negatively) by good friends and dating
partners[16]: Experiment 2). In addition, whereas
cheerful people report a relatively greater desire to
interact with favorable evaluators, depressed people
report a relatively greater desire to interact with
unfavorable evaluators (although the desire to interact
rarely dips below moderate;[17]: Experiment 1]. Com-
plementing these results, depressed people report
desiring to read an unfavorable personality assessment
more than a favorable one, whereas cheerful people
report desiring to read an favorable personality
assessment more than an unfavorable one (although
desire to read both remains generally high).[18] In sum,
the pattern of depressed people’s self-reported desire
for feedback matches the pattern of their actual
feedback-seeking.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF
MODERATORS OF SELF-
VERIFICATION EFFECTS
Key moderators of self-verification effects have only
been explored outside the domain of depression.
Nonetheless, they deserve mention, because they
illustrate the scope of SVT, and indicate what
additional findings require alternative explanation.
First, self-verification effects are time-dependent. In
particular, when people with negative self-views make a
snap judgment as to whether to interact with an
evaluator who views them either favorably or unfavor-
ably, they more often opt to interact with the former.
Only when they have ample time for reflection do they
more often opt to interact with the latter ([14]:
Experiment 3). In addition, when under time pressure,
people with negative self-views report being keener to
interact with an evaluator who views them favorably
than one who views them unfavorably; this effect is
attenuated, as usual, only in the absence of time
pressure[14]: Experiment 2; see also[22]: Experiment 4).
The standard interpretation of these findings is that
self-verification strivings, unlike self-enhancement
strivings, are mediated by relatively sophisticated
cognitive operations (i.e., involving the comparison of
feedback content with self-representations). When
time is short, these cognitive operations are under-
mined, and self-verification effects diminish.
Second, self-verification effects depend on the
importance and certainty of self-views. For example,
students with negative self-views, just like those with
positive self-views, are more committed to living with
their roommates to the extent that those roommates
share their (negative or positive) self-views, but only
when they hold those self-views with certainty and
regard them as important.[23] This finding recalls
another, in which people, even when their self-view is
negative, report greater intimacy with partners who see
them as they see themselves, but only when their
partners are spouses, not dates[24]: see also[11,21]). The
standard interpretation of these findings is that, when
identity is more strongly linked to self-views and
relationships, it matters more. Hence, verification
strivings are potentiated.
A CRITIQUE OF SVT
I will now argue that, despite all the above findings,
there are insufficient grounds for concluding that, in
order to safeguard psychic coherence, people want to
self-verify—that is, desire to confirm that they are the
type of person they already think they are. Note that I
will not be contesting the claim that people act in ways
that result in their identities being reinforced; the
empirical evidence, reviewed above, clearly indicates
that they do. Most notably, that evidence indicates that
even people with highly negative self-views act in such
ways. Indeed, SVT research is to be commended for
highlighting potentially maladaptive forms of self-
confirmation.[25] It is also to be commended for
empirically exploring a bold and counterintuitive
account of human motivation. Nonetheless, SVT
remains, like all scientific theories that make substantial
claims, open to perpetual disconfirmation. The endur-
ing validity of SVT is established, not merely by
accumulating inductive evidence consistent with its
predictions, but by repeatedly testing whether it
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accounts for empirical findings better than plausible
rival theories.[26] In this regard, I shall shortly outline
an alternative to SVT, called raison oblige theory (ROT)
for reasons that will become apparent. In brief, ROT
proposes that most or all of the findings cited in
support of SVT are a product, not of any verification
strivings, but of the obligations that everyday ration-
ality imposes on people.
BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVE:
DISTINCT AND NOT
ISOMORPHIC
Before outlining ROT, two points need to be
emphasized. First, behavior and motive are different
things. Second, behavior need not imply a correspond-
ing motive.
It might seem obvious that behavior and motive are
distinct entities; indeed, it is obvious. To spell it out,
behavior is what someone physically does, motive is
what mentally makes them do it. However, suppose it is
claimed that a person self-verified. Does this merely
mean that the person acted so as to solicit information
consistent with their self-view, or does it additionally
mean that they acted in this way under the influence of
the motive to self-verify? The ambiguity of the verb
(and related terms) leaves room for equivocation. It
also creates the possibility that self-verification, as a
behavioral effect that might be variously explained,
could be inadvertently construed as a behavioral effect
with only one explanation, namely a motive to stabilize
identity. Accordingly, the distinction between behavior
and motive must be kept clear.
In general, it is perilous to postulate motives that map
on perfectly to particular classes of behavior. For example,
people occasionally do things that are self-defeating (e.g.,
abusing drugs) or self-destructive (e.g., committing
suicide). Observing such oddities, psychoanalytic thinkers
have been prone to infer that isomorphic impulses must
lie behind such acts—the ‘‘death instinct’’ being the most
well-known example ([27]; see also[28]). However, empiri-
cal investigations suggest that, when people act against
their own best interests, it is not because they want to do
so, but rather because they wish to pursue other
incompatible interests, typically directed at the immediate
alleviation of negative affect.[29] Hence, care must be
taken not to rashly conclude that one motive, specific to a
class of behaviors, is the explanation for those behaviors,
when a host of rival motives remain viable. To their
credit, Swann and colleagues—perhaps prompted by
earlier criticisms[30]—have attempted to rule out at least
some explanations for why people with negative self-
views solicit critical (or avoid flattering) informa-
tion.[11,21,24] It now seems unlikely that the effect can be
put down, in any comprehensive way, to people seeking
to modify their partner’s perception of them, searching
for information to help them improve themselves, or
looking for like-minded others to validate their attitudes.
However, the perennial difficulty is that there could
always be some additional explanation for the effect that
has not yet been tested (compare research[27] seeking to
rule out egoistic motives for alleged altruistic helping).
Indeed, this is precisely what I contend.
There is a further reason why inferring isomorphic
motives from behavior is a tricky business: people
sometimes voluntarily do things that they do not want
to do, and sometimes voluntarily refrain from doing
things that they do want to do. An example of the
former would be reluctantly giving up leisure time to
perform administrative duties; an example of the latter
would be resisting the urge to invent qualifications in
order to secure a coveted job. If one accepts that people
sometimes disregard or override their desires, then it
immediately follows that one cannot automatically
infer, simply because someone has done something,
that they wanted to do it. Rather one would have to
concede that behavior, as an index of wanting, is
intrinsically fallible. Of course, it might still be the case
that, most of the time, people indeed do what they
want, so that, generally speaking, behavior is a good
baseline indicator of wanting. Nonetheless, there might
also be the case that, under particular circumstances,
behavior is particularly undiagnostic of wanting. Indeed,
I contend below that most of the behavioral evidence
cited in support of SVT has been gathered under
precisely such circumstances.
RAISON OBLIGE THEORY
What does all the above have to do with opting for
one type of feedback or interaction partner over
another? Consider again the two instances given above
of voluntary yet uncongenial acts. The reason that
someone would give up leisure time to perform
administrative duties is that they are obliged to do so;
and the reason that they would resist the urge to invent
qualifications is that they are not entitled to do so. Such
obligations and absences of entitlement, familiar to
everyone, are normative phenomena. Here, the norms
in question, which guide behavior, are moral in nature.
However, norms need not only be moral: they can also
be rational. Just as people are not at liberty to act
however they want, so people are not at liberty to
believe whatever they want. In particular, they are
obliged to believe some propositions they would rather
not believe, and not entitled to believe others proposi-
tions that they would rather believe. I will first illustrate
this abstract point with a simple if fanciful example, and
then extend the reasoning to the more sober subject of
depression.
THE UGLY DUCKLING’S
DILEMMA
Suppose I am a duckling with a negative self-view. I
earnestly believe, rightly or wrongly, that I am ugly.
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Further suppose that, thanks to my enhancement
strivings, I nonetheless yearn to be a beautiful swan.
Alas, despite the strength of my strivings, I feel certain
that I can never be a beautiful swan.2
Now imagine that two other ducklings, A and B,
share my pond. According to reliable sources, Duckling
A has a favorable view of my appearance, regarding me
as beautiful, whereas Duckling B has an unfavorable
view of my appearance, regarding me as ugly. The
opportunity now arises for me to interact with either
Duckling A or Duckling B. Which one should I choose
to interact with and why?
Suppose I opt to interact with Duckling B. (More-
over, to do justice to the empirical literature, also
suppose that I (a) claim that I want to do so, (b) would
do so even when the opportunity arose to do something
else, and (c) am not doing so either to improve my
appearance, change anyone’s opinion of me, or validate
my attitudes.) According to SVT, my choice of
interaction partner would constitute evidence that I
wanted to believe that I was ugly. However, ROT
suggests an alternative interpretation. Given that I
earnestly believe that I am ugly, I am (a) obliged to
believe that Duckling B’s critical view of my appearance
is true, and (b) not entitled to believe the Duckling’s A
flattering view of my appearance is true. In other
words, my self-view entails that I believe Duckling B is
right about me and Duckling A is wrong about me. But
if I truly believe this, then it follows that what Duckling
A believes about me, despite being congenial, cannot
strike me as probative, because any proposition I regard
as false cannot strike me as probative. On the other
hand, what Duckling B believes about me, despite
being uncongenial, may strike me as probative, because
any proposition I regard as true at least satisfies a
necessary condition for striking me as probative. Conse-
quently, if information about myself is what I seek, then
I have some grounds for interacting with Duckling B
but no grounds for interacting with Duckling A. True, I
do have a motive to interact with Duckling A over
Duckling B: the former praises me whereas the latter
deprecates me. However, because I am a rational as
well as a willful being, the choices I make are based, not
only on what I ideally want to believe, but also on what
I legitimately can believe—indeed, largely on the latter.
Hence, I choose to interact with Duckling B, not
Duckling A. The line of reasoning lies at the heart of
ROT.
Given the thrust of much recent research on the
self,[31] one might for forgiven for concluding that
rationality is dwarfed by the motive to self-enhance.
However, this would be a gross error. In fact,
rationality is pervasive and motives merely qualify it.
Were it not so, grandiose delusions would be common,
and realistic self-assessments rare. Yet the pervasive
impact of rationality is easily overlooked precisely
because it is part of the taken-for-granted architecture
of everyday cognition.[32] Consider one well-replicated
effect attributed to self-enhancement: the above-average
effect.[33] In general, people evaluate themselves as
superior than their peers on common personality
traits.[34] However, the effect only emerges if the traits
in question are sufficiently ambiguous to permit a
generous latitude of interpretation.[35] Reality con-
strains the motive to self-enhance: respondents may
want to believe they compare favourably to peers on
personality traits, but they cannot when those traits are
well-defined. In other words, raison (like noblesse) oblige:
to be reasonable is to accept that one’s beliefs must be
based on grounds, not motives. Credibility generally
trumps desirability.
WHY ROT EXPLAINS SELF-
VERIFICATION EFFECTS
Depressed people find themselves in the same type of
dilemma as the hypothetical duckling above. They may
wish to see themselves as joyful, optimistic, and self-
accepting, but they are only able to see themselves as
gloomy, pessimistic, and self-critical. Hence, they are
obliged to regard feedback about themselves as
probative only if it accords with their negative self-
view. Flattering feedback about themselves strikes them
as eminently desirable but unfortunately incredible,
whereas critical feedback strikes them as unfortunately
credible but eminently undesirable. As a result, there is
no need to posit a self-verification motive to explain why
depressed people would choose the latter over the
former (or interaction partners who might provide one
over the other). Choosing flattering feedback would
seem pointless to them because the information offered
would seem wrong; yet choosing the former might
seem worthwhile to them because the information
offered would seem right.3 The basic point is that
depressed people, being constrained by everyday
reason, tend to opt for feedback they think they merit
rather than for the feedback they most want to be true.
And although depressed people may hold irrationally
negative self-views, once they assume those negative
self-views are true, their appraisals of feedback duly
come to accord with their assumptions. So it is not, as
SVT maintains, that depressed self-views solicit critical
feedback out of a psychological desire to confirm existing
self-views. Rather, they solicit critical feedback out of
2Don’t worry: the story has a happy ending. Moreover, when the ugly
duckling becomes a beautiful swan, no identity crisis ensues, unlike
SVT would predict.
3If only feedback featuring information consistent with one’s self-
view can be regarded as probative and justified, then effects on
attention and memory attributed to verification strivings would also
admit of alternative explanation (Swann & Read, [43]: Experiment 1
and 3). In particular, people with negative self-views would both
attend to and recall critical feedback better (just like people with
positive self-views would tend to recall flattering feedback better)
because they would perceive that feedback to be relatively probative
and justified.
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rational obligation to honor feedback in keeping with
their existing self-views.
SOME QUESTIONABLE
EVIDENCE FOR SVT
Does ROT fit the empirical facts? I argue that it
does. Moreover, I argue that some findings cited in
support of SVTeither support ROT better or even call
SVT into question.
First, self-verification effects are consistently re-
ported as being driven by cognitive rather than
motivational factors.[36–38] For example[16] found that,
in a sample of cheerful and depressed people, ratings of
feedback credibility and self-descriptiveness intercor-
related highly, and when amalgamated into a single
index, predicted interest in interacting with evaluators
(Experiment 1). In addition, both[17] and [18] found
that, whereas cheerful people regarded flattering feed-
back as more accurate than critical feedback, depressed
people regarded critical feedback as more accurate than
positive feedback. They also found that, whereas
feedback desirability did not predict feedback or
interaction partner choice, perceived feedback accuracy
did (see also[37]). Finally, in normal samples,[39] found
that perceived feedback accuracy fully mediated feed-
back choice, while[[9]: Experiment 3] found that feed-
back consistent with self-views was regarded as
especially informative.
The standard SVT interpretation of these findings
runs as follows. In their quest to self-verify, people—
even depressed people with negative self-views—are
motivationally biased towards seeing self-descriptive
feedback as accurate, credible, and informative. Indeed,
so strong is this bias, that it entirely outweighs the bias
towards seeing flattering feedback as accurate, credible,
and informative. The alternative ROT interpretation
runs as follows. People have no motivational bias
toward seeing self-descriptive feedback as accurate,
credible, and informative: they simply do, in virtue of
rationally extrapolating, on the basis of the self-view
that they earnestly hold, that feedback consistent with
their self-view is liable to be true and feedback
inconsistent with it likely to be false.
Thus, both SVT and ROT are consistent with the
relevant data. However, whereas SVT neglects to take
into account everyday rationality and postulates an extra
motive to account for the obtained effects, ROT
endeavors to efficiently explain the obtained effects solely
on the basis of everyday rationality. Thus, if Occam’s
razor were to be invoked, ROT would be preferred.
Second, SVT predicts that verification strivings rely
on particular cognitive operations (i.e., comparing
feedback content with self-representations). However,
it should also predict that verification strivings influ-
ence affective state: strivings, after all, can be agreeably
satisfied or disagreeably frustrated. In particular,
a person with a negative self-view should be less
emotionally disturbed by critical feedback or by
interaction partners who view them unfavourably. This
is because whereas critical feedback would challenge
both the enhancement and verification strivings of a
person with a positive self-view, it would only challenge
the enhancement strivings of a person with a negative
self-view while also supporting their verification striv-
ings. Thus, whereas people with a positive self-view
would have both their ego and their identity threa-
tened—a potentially dismaying experience on all
counts—people with a negative self-view would only
have their ego threatened while also having their
identity reinforced—but a potentially dismaying ex-
perience on one count, but a reassuring one on another.
A converse argument could also be put forward to
predict that people with negative self-views should be
less emotionally buoyed by flattering feedback.
Yet what evidence exists suggests that people with
positive and negative self-views do not differ in how
disturbed they are by criticism or in how buoyed they are
by flattery.[40] In particular,[37] found that people with
positive and negative self-views generally did not differ in
their emotional reactions to flattering and critical
feedback: both ended up more moody, depressed,
anxious, and hostile after receiving the latter than after
receiving the former. In addition, both liked the source
of flattering feedback but disliked the source of critical
feedback (although people with negative self-view did
report being significantly more attracted the source of
negative feedback). Is it not odd that having one’s
identity reinforced or undermined does not moderate
how a person feels? Given these null findings, can
identity per se really be the critical factor in maintaining
clinical conditions such as depression and anxiety? One
unpublished study[41] did find that at least when
flattering feedback came from a credible source, people
with negative self-views were more anxious upon
receiving it. However, it is moot point whether that
anxiety was occasioned by frustrated verification striv-
ings. Might it not have derived simply from the
understandably distressing realization that they were
not entitled to believe the flattering feedback?
WHY ROT EXPLAINS
MODERATORS OF SELF-
VERIFICATION EFFECTS
ROTalso accounts nicely for why people with negative
self-views choose to interact with evaluators who view
them unfavorably when they can make a unhurried
choice, but evaluators who view them favorably when
they must make an immediate choice.[14] Quite simply,
time pressure imposes a cognitive load that disables the
explicit cognitive processes required to differentiate truth
from falsity, but it leaves intact the implicit cognitive
processes required to differentiate positivity from nega-
tivity, (see [42] for a general cognitive model). Hence,
people with negative self-views spontaneously seek the
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‘‘nice’’ evaluator but spurn the ‘‘nasty’’ one: any gloomy
reflections about their rational entitlements and obliga-
tions are nipped in the cognitive bud. The same
mechanism is likely to at least partly account for some
other conceptually similar research findings.[43,44]
ROT also accounts nicely for why self-verification
effects occur only when self-views are held with
certainty and seen as important.[23] The certainty and
importance of a self-view reflect the earnestness with
which it is believed. The more earnestly a self-view is
believed, the more information compatible with it will
be deemed true and worth obtaining, and the more
information incompatible with it will be deemed false
and worth ignoring. Hence, the more certain and
important a negative self-view, the more one should opt
for critical over flattering feedback, and the less
certain and important a negative self-view, the more
one should opt for flattering over critical feedback.
This would explain why depressed people, whose
negative self-views are more ingrained, show
stronger self-verification effects than people with
merely low self-esteem[16]: Experiments 1 and 2;[18],
as well as why self-verification effects are stronger for
well-elaborated and schematic traits.[45,46]
TWO LOOSE ENDS: PARTNER
PERCEPTIVENESS AND
SPONTANEOUS
VERBALIZATIONS
My critique so far shows that ROTcan plausibly and
efficiently account for most lines of evidence cited in
favor of SVT. However, it would be remiss not to cover
two further lines of evidence cited.
First, take the following pair of findings: (a) spouses
are more committed to and intimate with each another
to the extent that their partners see them as they see
themselves[24] and (b) spouses seek to disabuse their
partners of views of themselves that they do not
share.[13] Neither finding actually offers strong
evidence for verification strivings. For example, it
follows almost by definition that I will rate a partner
who sees me as I see myself as more intimate with me.
Moreover, if a partner who sees me more negatively
also treats me worse—a plausible correlation—I might,
through cognitive dissonance, escalate my commitment
to the relationship.[47] In addition, if a partner
fails to see me as I see myself, then it will subjectively
seem to me that my partner is mistaken, and
thereby become my perceived responsibility to
correct ll, it’s wrong to let others simply labour
under a delusion, especially if one happens to be
married to them.4
However, an ancillary finding in these studies seems
to contradict ROT. Ratings of partners’ perceptiveness
were not associated with either marital commitment
or intimacy.[24] But doesn’t ROT predict that
(ultimately long-term) interaction partners will be
(consistently) chosen depending on the probative value
of feedback they offer, and shouldn’t this vary as a
function of that partner’s rated perceptiveness? Not
necessarily. As it turns out, the item assessing partner
perceptiveness in these studies pertained to their
perceptiveness generally rather than within the relation-
ship specifically.[24] Furthermore, it would be as much a
problem for SVT as for ROT if partners’ rated
perceptiveness within the relationship did not predict
levels of commitment or intimacy. After all, if verifica-
tion strivings are to be satisfied, someone must believe
that someone else sees them as they see themselves,
that is, accurately and perceptively.
Second,[11] had participants with positive and nega-
tive self-views opt for an interaction partner who
evaluated them either favorably or unfavorably, and
then verbalize their reasons for having done so.
Participants’ verbalizations were subsequently coded
by four naı¨ve raters into different categories. The final
set of categories included ESV and PSV (see Footnote
1). A second group of raters then recoded the
verbalizations in terms of these categories. Results
suggested that, whereas both enhancement and ver-
ification strivings prompted people with positive self-
views to seek partners who evaluated them favorably,
only verification strivings prompted people with
negative self-views to seek partners who evaluated
them unfavorably. Given the seemingly bottom-up
nature of this investigation, the study would seem to
furnish reasonably good evidence for verification
strivings.
However, the manner in which categories were
derived is unclear from the article. From a footnote[11]
p. 394), it looks possible that no more than one rater
initially arrived at the epistemic self-verification
category independently, and no information was given
about how prominently particular categories featured.5
Furthermore, whether a category generated by the
rater actually corresponded to the category specified by
SVT was left up to the authors to decide subjectively.
Finally, it is not stated what criterion the authors used
to rule in or rule out alternative candidate categories.
Admittedly, the pattern of subsequent ratings did
accord neatly with what SVT predicts. However, some
niggling doubts remain. In particular, one wonders
whether, having been provided with the category ESV,
raters tended to shoehorn some otherwise difficult to
classify verbalizations into it. Here is the description of
the category in question: ‘‘The evaluator put the
speaker at ease by confirming his self-view. Explana-
4This might be construed as an instance of pragmatic self-
verification. But again, what this has to do with striving to verify
one’s identity is unclear.
5See Gregg et al. [17] for a methodology designed to estimate category
importance on the basis of frequency and priority with which coded
exemplars are collectively mentioned.
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tion: The speaker was reassured that he really knew
himself because the evaluator confirmed his self-
conception.’’ Two features of this category should be
noted: (a) it is comparatively complex and abstruse; and
(b) it requires raters to infer difficult to observe
intrapsychic processes. Both features might conceivably
have reduced the validity of the classification. In
addition, consider the three verbalization excerpts the
authors chose to illustrate the category,[11] p. 401): (a)
‘‘[the unfavorable evaluator] better reflects my own
view of myself from experience’’ (b) ‘‘y[the unfavor-
able evaluator] seems more accurate about what I think
about myself...I’d feel more at ease with someone
whoycan actively judge me for what I am’’ and (c)
‘‘That’s just a very good way to talk about me. Well, I
mean, after examining all of this I think [the unfavor-
able evaluator] pretty much has me pegged.’’ Note that,
whereas only one excerpt refers to putting the speaker
at ease, all three arguably refer to the probative value of
the assessment—just as ROTwould predict. Of course,
no firm conclusions can be drawn from such thin
second-hand evidence. However, it would seem that a
more detailed analysis of verbalizations is required to
establish that verification strivings rather than rational
obligations explain people’s choices of interaction
partner. This is especially so given that, as documented
above, there is a conspicuous absence of evidence that
critical feedback puts people with negative self-views
‘‘at ease’’, or that flattering feedback disturbs them.
TWO NEW EMPIRICAL STUDIES
So far, my contribution has been negative, taking
issue with the fundamental assumptions of SVT. Now
to make a positive contribution, I report two studies
whose findings tend to favor ROT over SVT.[48] As an
innovation, these studies inquire, not only into how
much people with positive and negative self-views
regard flattering and critical feedback as either desir-
able or credible,[37] but also into how much they want
such feedback to be true.
In Study 1 (N5 179), participants (mostly female
students) either filled out a booklet in class, or
responded to a computer program by themselves (it
did not affect the results). They began by completing a
standard measure of global self-esteem.[49] Next, they
reported their reactions, on seven-point bipolar scales,
to hypothetical feedback directed towards their per-
sonalities as a whole. The feedback took the form of
two sets of four statements—one set designed to be
highly flattering, the other highly critical (e.g., ‘‘Gen-
erally, I consider you to be a rather fine person’’ versus
‘‘As a person, I don’t think much of you’’).
Three classes of reactions to these statements were
then assessed. First, emotional reactions, involving
anticipated levels of sadness and anger (I would feel
[upset/hurt/annoyed/offended] by these statements). Sec-
ond, affective-volitional reactions, involving anticipated
levels of appreciation and desire (I would like what these
statements say/I would want these statements to be true / I
would want to interact with whoever made these
statements). Finally, cognitive reactions, involving the
perceived rational plausibility of statements (I would
regard these statements as accurate / I would find these
statements difficult to believe), and the anticipated
degree to which they would undermined identity (These
statements would disturb my sense of who I am).
Now, SVTwould predict that, relative to people with
higher self-esteem, people with lower self-esteem
would: (a) anticipate being less emotionally perturbed
by critical feedback, and more emotionally perturbed
by flattering feedback; (b) anticipate liking critical
feedback more, wanting it to be true more, and wanting
to interact with those providing it more; (c) anticipate
liking flattering feedback less, wanting it to be true less,
and wanting to interact with those providing it less; and
finally (d) anticipate that critical feedback would
disrupt their self-concept less, and that flattering
feedback would disrupt it more. In contrast, ROT
would predict that the above effects would not emerge;
it would instead merely predict that, relative to people
with higher self-esteem, people with lower self-esteem
would simply find critical feedback more plausible, and
flattering feedback less.
The results failed to support SVT. For
example, anticipated emotional reactions to feedback
failed to vary with levels of self-esteem; instead,
participants universally anticipated that flattering feed-
back would arouse pleasant emotions and that
critical feedback would arouse unpleasant ones. More-
over, directly contradicting SVT, the lower participants’
self-esteem, the less they anticipated liking critical
feedback, and the less keen they were for it to be true
(rsE.2). Also contrary to SVT, the lower participants’
self-esteem, they more they reported that any feedback
would disrupt their self-concept (rsE.2), whether it was
critical or flattering, see also [18] p. 364). However, as
ROT would predict, critical feedback was regarded as
more plausible as self-esteem increased, and flattering
feedback as more plausible as self-esteem decreased
(r’sE.4).
The upshot of Study 1 is that, even if people with
negative self-views want to receive critical feedback more
than people with positive self-views do, the former
seem less keen than the latter for such critical feedback
to be true (note: neither were very keen). In addition,
Study 1 suggests that people with negative self-views,
relative to people with positive self-views, find critical
feedback more convincing. The conjunction of these
two finding suggests that people with negative self-
views habitually opt for critical over flattering
feedback, not because they are eager to believe that their
self-view coincides with the feedback chosen, but
because they feel rationally obliged to concur with its
content.
Whereas Study 1 dealt with global self-view, Study 2
dealt with specific self-views. All participants (N5 141:
high school students and their parents) filled out
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individual booklets in several large groups. They began
by indicating, on four-point bipolar scales, whether
they regarded themselves positively or negatively, in
the domain of either attractiveness or intelligence.
Next, they read a description of a hypothetical
interaction with a person called Chris. As part of a
psychology study, this ‘‘Chris’’ had allegedly formed an
impression of them, written it down, and departed.
Participants were told they would now have to decide,
on the basis of what Chris had written, whether or not
to interact with Chris again. Chris’s impression was
randomly set to either confirm or disconfirm their
previously expressed self-view. More specifically, on the
relevant page of the booklet, participants self-view
(positive or negative) was restated, Chris’s agreement or
disagreement with it was indicated, and Chris’s
impression of them (flattering or critical) was de-
scribed. Finally, participants were asked the following
three questions: (a) All other things equal, how much
would you want to spend more time with Chris? (b) How
much do you want Chris’s opinion of you to be true? (c) How
accurate is Chris’s opinion of you?
Only a quarter of participants saw themselves as
unattractive, and an even smaller fraction saw them-
selves as unintelligent. Nonetheless, available results
were generally in line with those Study 2, insofar as
neither self-view correlated significantly with wanting
to interact with Chris or wanting his impression to be
accurate. SVT, of course, would have predicted that,
compared to participants with more positive self-views,
participants with more negative self-views would have
shown a greater desire to interact with a "critical"
Chris and for his impression of them to be true, as well
as a lesser desire to interact with a "flattering" Chris
and for his impression of them to be true. However, the
only correlational finding to emerge was, as in Study 1,
that participants with more negative self-views found
critical feedback more plausible, and flattering feed-
back less plausible (r’sE.5). Apart from that, all
participants self-enhancingly reported wanting Chris
impression to be true when flattering and false when
critical. Hence, the findings of Study 1 replicate and
generalize, thereby favoring ROT over SVT.
Admittedly, both these studies have limitations.
Participants reported how they would respond to
feedback as opposed to actually responding to it; and
the mediating role for feedback plausibility was
inferred from circumstantial evidence as opposed to
being directly demonstrated. However, in the defense
of the studies, two points might be made. First, the
onus is on the skeptic to explain why imaginative
introspection should be utterly blind to self-verification
strivings that are alleged to cause such powerful
behavioral effects (and see[16,39] for methodologically
similar investigations). Second, the evidence yielded by
these studies is arguably no more circumstantial than
that yielded by classic self-verification studies, in which
self-verification strivings are neither directly measured
or manipulated.
IMPLICATIONS FOR Pineles et al. [1]
It is a prima facie puzzle why abused women, who
tend to be depressed,[50] are often so reluctant to leave
their abusive male partner. One explanation might be
that, having originally freely entered into a relation-
ship, and then invested a lot effort trying to improve it
once it turned abusive, they are motivated to rationalize
their choices and efforts by concluding that the
relationship is worth pursuing, even when it is
not.[47,51] However, SVT suggests another explanation:
abused women stay in abusive relationships because
they want to verify the pre-existing negative self-view
that goes along with it. To put it baldly, they would
rather get psychologically humiliated and physically
hurt than abandon the negative self-views that afford
them a sense of predictability and control.
In order to muster evidence for this hypothesis,[1]
had groups of abused and nonabused women rate how
positively two people would rate specific aspects of
their personality: themselves, and a student clinician.
Next, both groups of women ranked their relative
preference for feedback about each of these aspects,
ostensibly to be provided by the clinician. To estimate
verification strivings, these rankings were correlated
within-subject with the absolute differences between the
women’s self-ratings on each aspect and the ratings the
women anticipated the clinician would give them.
Greater congruence was deemed evidence of stronger
verification strivings, lesser congruence of weaker
verification strivings.
As it turned out, the correlation obtained was small
(r5 .13), and did not differ across both groups of
women. However, the logic behind the inference that
this correlation reflects verification strivings is suspect
on multiple grounds.
First, although the use of absolute values ensured
that differences in self and anticipated clinician
ratings contributed (inversely) to estimates of
congruence regardless of the direction of those
differences, it could still have been the case that, say,
most anticipated clinician ratings exceeded most or all
self-ratings, such that women additionally preferring
feedback about aspects of personality when the
disparities were smaller. If so, then all estimates of
congruence would potentially have been contaminated
by enhancement strivings (because women would have
preferred feedback on those aspects of personality
when they did not rate themselves worse than the
clinician did).
Second, and relatedly, it is not clear what the
women’s estimates of clinician’s ratings were supposed
to represent. Were they the ratings that the women
would ideally desire, those that they would absolutely
dread, or those they would expect a naı¨ve young
student clinician to have? In the absence of any definite
answer to this question, it is impossible to interpret
what the absolute differential between the women’s
self-rating and the anticipated clinician rating means.
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By extension, it is also impossible to interpret what any
correlations with this absolute differential mean.
Third—and most relevant to the thrust of this
article—the assumption that the congruence between
the women’s and the anticipated clinician’s ratings
would solely or even largely a function of verification
strivings is untenable. All ratings would have been
informed, not only by what the women wanted to
believe, but also by what they were obliged to believe.
The authors, I submit, like many other self-verification
researches, failed to take adequate account of the
degree to which ratings are constrained by everyday
rationality.
Pineles et al.[1] also looked at whether abused and
nonabused women differed in terms of the correlations
between their ranked preferences for feedback and the
signed differences between their self-ratings on each
aspect and the ratings they anticipated the clinician
would give them. Here, patterns reminiscent of self-
verification effects emerged: whereas nonabused wo-
men showed a preference for feedback about aspects of
personality where the clinician evaluated them more
favorably than they evaluated themselves, abused
women did not. Moreover, these effects were statisti-
cally mediated by levels of depression. Again, however,
these findings cannot be deemed evidence of verifica-
tion strivings. The possibility that women’s ratings
could be a function of something other than motive
was not even considered, much less eliminated.
CLOSING COMMENTS
In this article, I have attempted to make the case that
the existing evidence for self-verification strivings—the
desire to confirm that one is who one already believes
oneself to be—is much weaker than is commonly
asserted. Indeed, the possibility remains open that
people never strive to bolster their identity per se.
Instead, people with negative self-views—including
depressives and abused women—may seek out critical
feedback and disdain positive feedback, not because
they want the former to be true and the latter false, but
rather because their reason tells that they are obliged to
believe the former and not entitled to believe the latter.
The premises from which people with which negative
self-views begin, of course, are often tragically un-
founded in themselves, but the inferences they deduce
from it are not. The real challenge for depression
researchers may be, not to curb depressed people’s
desire to verify that they are gloomy, pessimistic, and
self-critical, but instead to find effective ways of
convincing them that they can be joyful, optimistic,
and self-accepting.
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